

Why Can't I have Both? Integrating Reduced Form and Structural Work

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With wonderful help from Yuan Shi!

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Type 1
- 3 Type 2
- 4 Type 3
- 5 Type 4
- 6 Type 5
- 7 Conclusion

The topics of this talk are not well-defined

- ▶ “Reduced-form” means different things to different people.
 - ▶ A regression derived from an economic model
 - ▶ What happens when you solve a three-stage least squares problem in graduate school (Cowles Foundation)

- ▶ “Structural” means different things to different people.
 - ▶ A type of model
 - ▶ A type of empirical work

- ▶ So I am going to need to define terms.

Statistical and Economic Models

- ▶ A statistical model describes the relation between two or more random variables:

$$y = x\beta + u$$

- ▶ Reduced form techniques aim for an estimate of β .
- ▶ An economic model starts with assumptions about
 - ▶ agents' preferences
 - ▶ constraints
 - ▶ firms' production functions
 - ▶ some notion of equilibrium, etc.
- ▶ Generates predictions about the relation between observable, often endogenous variables.

Structural Estimation

- ▶ Structural estimation ascertains whether optimal decisions implied by a model resemble actual decisions by agents.
- ▶ Estimate an economic model's parameters and assess model fit.
- ▶ Parameters to estimate often include
 - ▶ Preference parameters (e.g., risk aversion coefficient)
 - ▶ Technology parameters (e.g. production function's curvature)
 - ▶ Other time-invariant institutional features (e.g. agents' bargaining power, financing frictions)

What Kinds of Econometrics for Structural Estimation

- ▶ GMM
- ▶ MLE
- ▶ SMM (SMD)
- ▶ SMLE
- ▶ Indirect Inference
- ▶ All of the two-step methods used by the structural IO folks.

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Reduced form and structural are both **useful** for different purposes

- ▶ Reduced form is great for getting answers to causal questions.
 - ▶ The bread and butter of program evaluations
 - ▶ Only one part of a larger picture of most other fields in finance
 - ▶ Only useful for understanding economic mechanisms in the presence of assumptions

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 - ▶ Only useful for understanding economic mechanisms in the presence of assumptions
- ▶ Structural is useful for questions involving the word “why,” but requires a mathematical model.
 - ▶ Counterfactual (what-if) questions
 - ▶ Impulse responses
 - ▶ Economic intuition
- ▶ Often a richer answer to a question involves both methods

I am going to illustrate these points with examples

Five “types” of integration

- 1 The model incorporates reduced-form shocks
- 2 Part of the model is simplified via a reduced-form regression to reduce complexity
- 3 The model extends the external validity of the reduced-form result
- 4 A reduced-form regression serves as a check of external validity
- 5 Use a model to address regression selection problems

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Type 1: Build the model to incorporate reduced form shocks

- ▶ The paper has a clean natural experiment or exogenous shock.
- ▶ A model is built to feature this exogenous shock
- ▶ Why?
 - ▶ quantify unobservable parameters that drive the reduced form exercises
 - ▶ observe counterfactuals
 - ▶ provide economic intuition by tying the two estimations together

Why not?

- ▶ To provide “identification” (Kahn and Whited 2018)
- ▶ “Causal” elasticities are often influenced by more than one model parameter.
 - ▶ Why we see all of the cross sectional tests that researchers do to uncover “mechanisms.”

Two Examples

- ▶ Briggs, Cesarini, Lindqvist, and Östling (2021)
- ▶ Ivanov, Pettit, and Whited (2020)

Windfall gains and stock market participation

Briggs et al. (2021)

Three research questions:

- ▶ What happens to stock market participation after cash windfalls?
- ▶ Why are some households not participating in the stock market?
- ▶ What are the costs preventing them from doing so?

What is the reduced form methodology?

- ▶ A windfall wealth increase from lottery prizes is an exogenous shock to household wealth.
- ▶ Random assignment of lottery prizes payment methods differentiates
 - ▶ the one-time stock entry cost from
 - ▶ the per-period participation cost

What do we learn from the reduced form part?

- ▶ A 150K USD windfall from lottery wealth increases the probability of stock ownership in post-lottery years by 4%.
- ▶ The effect is concentrated in:
 - ▶ previous stock market non-participants
 - ▶ lump sum prize payments (instead of monthly installments)
- ▶ The last item shows that the one-time entry cost (instead of the per-period participation cost) explains household stock market non-participation.

What is the structural methodology?

- ▶ The authors use a life-cycle model with costly stock market participation choice and an unexpected lottery prize windfall.
- ▶ Estimation method is Simulated Minimum Distance

What question that can be answered by the structural part?

- ▶ How big does the entry cost have to be to explain the data.
- ▶ The average entry cost for pre-lottery equity market nonparticipants is over 31K USD, ...
- ▶ But even this cost cannot reconcile the small amount of participation.
- ▶ Estimation of models with behavioral biases also does not help.
- ▶ Data on survey of beliefs indicates that belief biases (pessimism) are the likely culprit.

What do we learn from a combination of methods that we could not learn otherwise?

- ▶ The reduced form setting of random sized lottery prize provides an exogenous shock to household income
 - ▶ for identification of the directional effect of wealth on participation.
 - ▶ for identification of the **type** stock market participation cost.
- ▶ The structural method makes it possible to quantify the size of the cost.
- ▶ Eliminate possible explanations for nonparticipation

Taxes Depress Corporate Borrowing: Evidence from Private Firms

Ivanov et al. (2020)

- ▶ Research question: How do taxes affect capital structure?
- ▶ Reduced-form part uses a staggered difference-in-difference setting to establish
 - ▶ Causality
 - ▶ Sign and magnitude
- ▶ Structural part illustrates
 - ▶ Intuition
 - ▶ Counterfactual effects on firm value

Newish data on private firms

- ▶ Use comprehensive samples of U.S. privately-held firms.
- ▶ Staggered diff-in-diff around changes in state corporate income taxes since the late 1980s.
- ▶ Distinguish between enactment and effective dates of tax changes.

We obtain directional findings from the reduced form part

- ▶ Corporate leverage increases following tax cuts and decreases following tax hikes.
- ▶ Firms increase investment following corporate income tax cuts.
- ▶ Results are strongest for small, healthy firms but also present in large public firms.

The second part of the paper is structural

- ▶ We estimate an equilibrium model of an economy
- ▶ Firms are financed by internal profits and external **risky** debt.
- ▶ They make debt, hiring, and investment decisions in anticipation of future tax changes.
- ▶ Interest expense **is** tax deductible

Where does the reduced-form part fit in?

- ▶ One of the “moments” we match is the reduced-form tax elasticity.
- ▶ We include it to identify firms perceptions of tax permanence
- ▶ Tax changes perceived to last longer have larger effects
- ▶ Including the moment also makes the model relevant to this particular experiment

What do we learn from the structural part?

- ▶ We get intuition for the reduced-form result:
 - ▶ Interest tax shields are just one part of a larger picture that includes the level of default thresholds.
 - ▶ The **quantitative** effect of taxes on default thresholds is much larger than the **quantitative** effect on interest tax shields.
- ▶ We can look at the effects on firm value:
 - ▶ Taxes depress value more than they would in the absence of debt.
 - ▶ Loss of interest tax shields.

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Type 2: part of the model is simplified via a reduced-form regression to reduce complexity

- ▶ Very useful for highly complex models
- ▶ Simplify part of the model whose mechanism is
 - ▶ too complicated to add to the current model
 - ▶ does not affect the results of other parts of the model
- ▶ All of the currently very popular demand estimation methods fit in this category.
- ▶ The conditional choice probability methods in Hotz and Miller (1993) and the policy function approach in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) are two examples.
 - ▶ Kang, Lowery, and Wardlaw (2015) use CCP methods
 - ▶ Matvos and Seru (2014) use the BBL methods

The costs of closing failed banks: A structural estimation of regulatory incentives

Kang et al. (2015)

- ▶ How do regulators choose whether to close a troubled bank?
- ▶ Dynamic discrete choice model: close/open
 - ▶ an aversion to close banks against
 - ▶ higher risk and future deposit-insurance costs from delayed closure
- ▶ The difference in the regulator utility from each decision is proportional to the probability of each decision.
- ▶ The latter can be estimated via a **logit**.
- ▶ With the estimated utility functions, they conduct counterfactuals:
 - ▶ Delayed closures are driven by “desire to defer costs, an aversion to closing the largest and smallest troubled banks, and political influence.”

Market Power and Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence from a Structural Estimation

Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao (2020)

- ▶ To what extent do market power and regulatory frictions affect the pass-through of policy rates to bank lending decisions?
- ▶ This is by nature a structural question.
- ▶ The model has to be very complicated
 - ▶ Equilibrium between borrowers, lenders, and banks
 - ▶ Imperfect competition between banks
 - ▶ Dynamic optimization decisions by banks

We simplify the problem by using demand estimation

- ▶ Estimate loan and deposit elasticities using the methods in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
- ▶ Plug these estimates into the model.
- ▶ Markets automatically clear because interest rate choices by banks imply optimal demand from the estimated elasticities.

Several interesting results

- ▶ Deposit market power matters a great deal, but so does bank capital regulation
- ▶ The bank-capital and deposit market power channels interact to generate a reversal rate.
- ▶ Stylized facts support the deposit market power channel and the reversal rate.

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Type 3: the model is used to extend the external validity of the reduced-forms results

- ▶ Assessing the general equilibrium consequences of reduced form estimates
 - ▶ Lots of examples in urban and environmental economics

- ▶ Predicting the effect of non-compliers in a reduced-form regression

Who Creates New Firms when Local Opportunities Arise?

Bernstein, Colonnelli, Malacrino, and McQuade (2021)

- ▶ Brazilian matched employer-employee data, with rich employee characteristics
- ▶ Ask whether changes in *global* commodity prices affect local entrepreneurial activity
- ▶ Generate Bartik-style variation in the income of municipalities
- ▶ Young potential entrepreneurs respond to these shocks more than older ones
- ▶ This strong response is concentrated in municipalities with more developed banking sectors and a skilled population.

The structural part tells us what happens when population composition changes

- ▶ This part of the paper extends the results beyond the causal elasticities in the first part.
- ▶ Dynamic discrete choice problem between wage employment and entrepreneurship.
- ▶ Selection into entrepreneurship depends on the dispersion in a taste parameter that can be disciplined with the data.
- ▶ Parameter estimates yield two interesting results.
 - ▶ A 10% increase in the fraction of young people increases firm creation by around 2%.
 - ▶ If this increase in the young is concentrated in the non-educated, this effect is muted by 30%.

Do the Right Firms Survive Bankruptcy?

Antill (2020)

- ▶ Are decisions to liquidate efficient, and does inefficient liquidation reduce creditor recovery?
- ▶ What is the question that can be answered by the reduced form part?
 - ▶ For compliers who are close to the marginal threshold of liquidation versus emerging, ...
 - ▶ the average liquidation reduces creditor recovery by 58 cents on the dollar.
- ▶ What is the question that can be answered by the structural part?
 - ▶ The structural part extends the conclusion to non-compliers and estimates that overall, 60% of liquidations are inefficient.

Do the Right Firms Survive Bankruptcy?

Antill (2020)

- ▶ What is the reduced form methodology?
 - ▶ Use randomly assigned judge as an exogenous shock to firm liquidation versus reorganization.
 - ▶ The result is a local average treatment effect that only applies to compliers.

- ▶ What is the structural methodology?
 - ▶ A generalized Roy (1951) selection framework: binary choice between liquidation and reorganization.
 - ▶ In a way similar to the Heckman model, it allows for a sample-selection correction to extend the results to non-compliers.

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Type 4: Reduced form is used to assess model validity

- ▶ Dynamic models provide a plethora of predictions
- ▶ Some of these predictions are used to estimate the model
- ▶ But others are not and can be compared to actual data predictions
- ▶ Formal test of “unused” moment equality in Bazdresch, Kahn, and Whited (2018)
- ▶ There are many many many examples

Technological innovation and executive pay inequality

Frydman and Papanikolaou (2018)

- ▶ Executive pay and the gap between executive and worker pay have grown in the last 50 years
- ▶ Estimate a model of technological innovation to help understand these facts
- ▶ The model *also* has predictions about the relations between
 - ▶ Executive pay and innovation (+)
 - ▶ Executive pay and growth opportunities (+)
- ▶ Both hold up in reduced form regressions

Corporate Money Demand

Gao, Whited, and Zhang (2020)

- ▶ Reduced-form regressions of corporate cash on interest rates produce a robust hump shape
- ▶ Estimate a model to understand this fact.
- ▶ Use mostly means and variances for identification.
- ▶ The model can reproduce correlations between output and cash, investment, and debt not targeted in the estimation.

Reputation and investor activism: A structural approach

Johnson and Swem (2021)

- ▶ Why do targets settle so frequently with activists who face large costs of proxy fights
- ▶ Why do activists initiate so many proxy fights despite the free rider problem?
- ▶ Estimate a model of (unobservable) activist reputation by MLE.
- ▶ Use the model based reputation measure to predict several outcomes (CARs, 13D filings) in both the model and the data.

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Type 5: the model is used to solve a selection problem in a regression

- ▶ A Heckman correction is basically a regression paired up with a probit, ...
- ▶ which is itself an outcome of a random utility problem.
 - ▶ The agent chooses to stay in the sample if their utility exceeds a threshold
 - ▶ This is a very simple structural problem
- ▶ But the selection model can be much more elaborate and realistic.

How smart is smart money: A two-sided matching model of venture capital Sorensen (2007)

- ▶ Empirical fact: start-up companies funded by more experienced venture capitalists are more likely to go public.
- ▶ Why?
 - ▶ Direct influence of the VC on the company
 - ▶ Sorting of better companies with better VCs
- ▶ You cannot answer this question with a regression.

The structural part estimates a two-sided matching model

- ▶ Each VC can have more than one match, but each company can have only one VC.
- ▶ The equilibrium concept is stability: perturbing the matching outcome would make would make any company's valuation worse.
- ▶ Estimate the likelihood of an IPO jointly with the matching model using MCMC.
- ▶ The structural part allows for separating the the effects of VC influence versus sorting.

Venture Capital Contracts

Ewens, Gorbenko, and Korteweg (2021)

- ▶ How do VC contracts affect startup value?
- ▶ How big is the size of the pie? What is the split of the pie between the VC and the startup?
- ▶ A naïve regression of startup outcomes on contract features omits endogenous matching of VC and firm quality.
- ▶ This selection problem is treated with the estimation of a dynamic search model of VCs and startups

Venture Capital Contracts Model

- ▶ VC's offer contracts, and entrepreneurs either accept or continue searching.
- ▶ The equilibrium contract is endogenous to the quality of the agents.
 - ▶ Sometimes high-quality entrepreneurs match with medium-quality VCs to get a better deal.
- ▶ The value of the startup and the split of value between VC and the entrepreneur are modeled in reduced form manner.

Estimation

- ▶ Parameters are estimated by GMM.
- ▶ The reduced-form parameters describing the effects of contract features on the size and split of the pie are estimated jointly.
- ▶ The selection problem is absorbed by the endogenous matching feature of the model.

Venture Capital Contracts

- ▶ What do we learn from a combination of methods that we could not learn otherwise?
- ▶ The contract terms we observe in reality do not maximize firm value
- ▶ The terms give the VC too much pie.
- ▶ Startups still benefit from matching with high-quality VCs because they grow the pie.

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Fighting about reduced-form versus structural methods is a waste of time

- ▶ Different methods answer different kinds of questions.
- ▶ They can be used separately (e.g., Hennessy and Whited 2005; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon 2007)
- ▶ They can be used together.

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